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This thesis evaluates recent decisions to expand the National Guard (NGB) State 
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assessing their evolution and present activities.  Specifically, the Partnership for Peace 
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evaluation provides a foundation for prescribing changes to the SPP doctrine for future 
relationships throughout the Asia-Pacific region.  From this evidence the main body of 
work focuses on predictions of applying this regionally specific model.  It looks 
particularly at evolutionary characteristics needed to make the program feasible, 
discussing current partnerships and those countries awaiting future consideration.  
Mongolia is addressed in detail, being the newest member country petitioning for 
partnership.  Finally, and most important, the extent to which the program affects 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
This thesis evaluates recent decisions to expand the National Guard (NGB) State 
Partnership Program into the Asia-Pacific region and examines potential effects this 
expansion will have on the new partners created there.  It predicts likely responses from 
non-participants and defends against engagement program detractors.  Even though these 
programs have matured through the 1990s and deliver tangible benefits to both partner 
countries and their mated states, there are critics who object to Department of Defense 
activities that pull personnel and resources away from traditional war fighting objectives.  
These include academics like Chalmers Johnson, who argues that U.S. foreign policy 
constitutes meddling and invites “blowback” in the form of terrorism, and military 
officers who underestimate the educational, operational and diplomatic value intrinsic to 
these programs.1  Furthermore, recent military call-ups of traditional guard and reserve 
forces to fight the war on terrorism have increased operational tempos to the point where 
state adjutant generals are reconsidering participation in programs they view as non-
essential.  The small footprint of NGB engagement programs and their inherent flexibility 
contradict these accusations and offer essential capabilities for prosecuting a defense in 
the face of the current global security dilemma.  
The thesis argues that the SPP is a sound, proven operation with a credible history 
currently resting on the edge of greater opportunities.  It offers new challenges as the 
United States and its allies prosecute the war on international terrorism and provides a 
unique system that benefits national security objectives. By examining European 
engagement programs initiated through NATO in the mid-1980s, assessing their 
evolution and present activities, both achievements and shortfalls are presented to answer 
the disapproving and promote further expansion of these programs.  Specifically, the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) 
are addressed.  This evaluation provides a foundation for prescribing changes to the SPP 
doctrine for future relationships throughout the Asia-Pacific region.   
                                                 
1 See Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt, 
2001) for an opposing opinion on American intervention and engagement.  
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The main body of research focuses on predicting the prospects for applying this 
new universal SPP model in the region.  It looks specifically at evolutionary 
characteristics that must be taken to make the program feasible, discussing current 
partnerships and those countries waiting in the wings, analyzing program limitations and 
problems associated with creating and sustaining Pacific engagement operations.  
Mongolia is discussed in detail, being the newest member country petitioning for 
partnership.  Finally, and most important, the extent to which the program affects 
regional stability, paying particular attention to China, will be assessed with 
recommendations for further program refinements for inclusion of pivotal countries that 
are positioned to support U.S. national interests. 
This research draws on scholarly source materials for guidance and support.  
Books and documents on the Asia-Pacific region’s security have laid the foundation upon 
which analysis of engagement can be studied.  Case studies of past and present 
partnerships provide the tools and experiences for recommending changes in building the 
Pacific blueprint and Interviews with administrators of the PfP and SPP from the state, 
national and international levels provide the “person-on-the-ground” insight into how 
these programs are functioning.  Foreign and domestic press reports, commentaries, and 
official written statements have also been consulted to broaden the body of evidence 
supporting the recommendations offered.  By drawing on this extensive range of 
information, a comprehensive picture of domestic and international reactions to the 
introduction of Pacific engagement programs, in particular the SPP, emerges from which 
the degree of acceptance for it may be determined and suggestions for further expansion 
may be scrutinized.  
 Chapter II establishes the groundwork for the recommendations that follow by 
tracing the origins of U.S. engagement programs, illustrating their historic development 
with nations of the former Soviet bloc and the evolution of these programs through to 
their present incarnations.  From a broad range of perspectives, both positive and 
negative, a picture has been painted concerning how early engagement efforts were 
defined in the Bush and Clinton administrations and how these evolved in Europe and the 
Balkans.  In the words of Lt Col Michael Dubie in an article for National Guard, “the 
SPP is a bilateral program that links U.S. states directly with developing democracies 
3 
around the world in support of U.S. national security.”2  The National Guard’s leadership 
in expanding the SPP is a testament to its commitment to the program in furthering these 
security and military objectives.  At the 2001 SPP conference in Gulfport, Mississippi, 
Major General Raymond F. Rees described SPP expansion in his opening remarks: 
Beginning in 1993 at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff the State Partnership Program has grown from one partnership to 
seventeen partnerships in Europe, eleven in the Americas, four in Central 
Asia and our first in the Far East.  And the program continues to expand.”3  
Addressing specific examples of both successful and unsuccessful partnership 
interactions, the thesis draws conclusions regarding promising techniques that were 
established and assessments flaws in those relationships.  Analyzing engagement in this 
fashion aids recognition and avoidance of similar mistakes while at the same time 
gleaning wisdom and experience toward a successful strategy in future Asia-Pacific 
region partnerships. 
Employing the techniques outlined in Chapter II, a blueprint for strengthening and 
expanding the Asian-Pacific State Partnership Program is discussed in Chapter III.  This 
blueprint takes into account the fact that an original intention of the European Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) model - namely, bringing former Soviet Bloc countries closer to NATO 
membership - is not applicable in the Pacific (extending NATO’s reach to the 
Philippines, for example, makes little sense).  The underlying principles that made the 
European program viable, however, are compatible with the new model for the Pacific.  
The research emphasizes appropriate regional issues, elaborating on benefits afforded 
through partnership.  These include building democratic institutions, projecting American 
values, fostering free market economies, and promoting military-to-military and civilian-
to-military relationships.4  Chapter III defines how these issues serve Asian-Pacific 
partner countries and prescribes adaptations for civilian-military relations, economic 
aspects, and security concerns where necessary.  The chapter also addresses regionally 
                                                 
2 Michael Dubie, “The National Guard: Promoting United States national security,” National Guard, Sep 1998, 
81.   
3 Raymond F. Rees, Major General, USA, “Opening remarks for CNGB 2001 SPP Conference in Gulfport MS, 13 
March 2001”, available online at: www.ngb.dtic.mil/chief/vchief/speeches/20010313.shtml 
4 Dubie, 81. 
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specific concerns that administrators face currently or expect to face in the near future as 
the program matures and expands.  
Chapter III concludes by focusing on current security and stability questions in 
the Pacific related to U.S. engagement practices there.  Identifying various hot spots in 
the region, the chapter scrutinizes contemporary tensions and conflicts regarding their 
likely effects on new partnerships and the consequences any increases of U.S. military 
presence will have on Asian interests and concerns.  Reflecting upon the structure and 
objectives of the Pacific SPP/SOP defined earlier, the chapter offers judgments regarding 
Asian countries that are knocking at the SPP door and those that are not yet asking but 
may be considered worthy of courtship by the National Guard.  The chapter concludes by 
analyzing how building an extensive structure of relationships affects strategic shaping in 
the Asian-Pacific geopolitics and what potential impact it will have on overall stability 
throughout the region.   
The newest country petitioning for a state partnership is Mongolia.  Wedged 
between the regions’ two major powers, China and Russia, Mongolia serves as a strategic 
buffer in regional security.  Throughout much of its twentieth century history, the country 
has lived under the Soviet Union’s shadow, emerging in 1990-92 to declare itself 
independent and democratic.  Having already been accepted into the SPP by U.S. Pacific 
Command (USPACOM) and National Guard administrators, Mongolia awaits an 
American partner state.  Chapter IV reveals engagement objectives Mongolia wishes to 
pursue with its future state partner.  Using interviews with national-level program 
directors and research into Mongolia’s history since the beginning of the 20th century, 
Chapter IV uses Mongolia as a case study. 
China is increasingly becoming the most important regional player in the Asian-
Pacific and as such, it requires special consideration as the SPP establishes a foothold 
within the region.  Chapter V assesses China’s attitude toward this growing U.S. presence 
and its application of the concepts presented in previous chapters.  It provides a 
discussion on measures by regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to guarantee 
regional stability and support, describing how these actions parallel or constrain U.S. 
5 
engagement efforts.  It is reasonable to assume that China would be suspicious of 
American hegemony and tactical encirclement through engagement activities in the 
region - especially of operations like the SPP and its list of prospective state partners.  
The current candidate partner, Mongolia, as well as existing mature relationships in the 
Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 
particular present the most perceptible implications to Chinese ambitions in the region.  
Mongolia, which shares a 2500-mile border with China, presents potentially destabilizing 
challenges as it cultivates membership in engagement programs such as the SPP.  The 
SPP relationships in Central Asia testify to the value of engagement for America’s 
strategic interests and foreign policy, made all the more clear in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  U.S. military activity has recently increased within these 
countries as staging bases for the war in Afghanistan, and the partnerships cultivated with 
these countries helped pave the road for their participation.  Indicative of Beijing’s 
concerns, Chinese analysts have been suspicious of alliances in the region as potentially 
targeted against them and are increasingly voicing these concerns openly.  As Chapter V 
shows, the extension of the Partnership for Peace program into the Asia-Pacific has been 
cited as a primary focus of these allegations, and the chapter assesses how the United 
States and the National Guard have in the past and should, in the future, handle them.5 
Domestic American critics have raised some of these same issues.  Among them 
is Dr. Larry M. Wortzel of the Heritage Foundation, who warns against rushing blindly 
into new partnerships with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).6  Since one perspective 
in the China debate calls for military-to-military reengagement with the PLA, the chapter 
also evaluates the anxieties and the opportunities of this course of action and calculates 
possible Chinese responses to the extension of the SPP in the Asia-Pacific. 
The Asian-Pacific region that USPACOM shoulders U.S. military responsibility 
for comprises approximately two-thirds of the Earth’s surface.  Establishing a successful 
SPP presence in this area of the world is beneficial to U.S. strategic interests.  However, 
                                                 
5 See David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security”, International Security, Vol. 
24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), 119.  
6 Larry M. Wortzel, PhD., “Why Caution is Needed In Military Contacts with China”, December 2, 1999, 
available online: http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1340.html 
6 
extending SPP and other Western engagement activities to this region also carries the risk 
of upsetting Beijing and raising concerns among current and potential allies, partners, and 
competitors, even though the program maintains a small operational footprint and its 
objectives lend benign support for emerging democratic institutions.  Throughout history, 
balance of power politics has continuously teetered on issues such as this.  The final 
review presented in Chapter VI concludes by offering recommendations with respect to 




































II.     ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE SPP 
If the American goal is to re-create Ohio in Kosovo or Haiti, then the 
occupiers are doomed to be disappointed.  But if the goals are more 
modest, then American rule can serve the interests of the occupiers and the 
occupied alike.  Put another way, “nation-building” is generally too 
ambitious a task, but ‘state-building’ is a more realistic objective.  The 
apparatus of a functioning state can be developed much more quickly than 
a national consciousness.7 
 
No longer should The National Guard be considered the “weekend warrior 
command” or be the butt of Hollywood jokes.  The National Guard, in addition to its 
essential contributions to national defense, has since the early 1990s served a unique 
mission to U.S. stability operations worldwide.  Two engagement programs, NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), 
were designed in the waning days of the Bush administration and implemented during the 
Clinton administration.  These have brought traditional guardsmen in direct contact with 
counterparts in emerging democracies and former Warsaw Pact nations in military-to-
military, “environment shaping” relationships.  An examination of the processes these 
two programs have undergone reveals the potential impact on regional stability and 
security they present.   
 
 
A.     THE BIRTH OF “LEGITIMATE PART TIME DIPLOMACY” 
As the Berlin Wall fell and the USSR gasped its last breath, the former Soviet 
satellite nations that found themselves without the support of a protective patron.  
Secretary of Defense William Perry called this era a “point between a cold war that is 
                                                 
7 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
2002), 346. 
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over and a peace that is not yet secure.”8  This period saw a surge in interest for the 
methods of government constructed and employed by the United States and the European 
Union.  As these ex-Warsaw Pact countries investigated Western-style democracy and 
pondered the potential for assuring their security through NATO membership, 
Washington realized that its own national security policy could be advanced “through 
constructive military relationships with [these] developing countries under non-
confrontational conditions.”9  Thus was born the State Partnership Program and its 
subordinate element, the Military Liaison Team (MLT).  The purpose, as John Groves 
and others pointed out, was to introduce a forum “in the spirit of a Partnership for Peace” 
where regional and international ideas on defense, politics and economics could be 
shared, filling the strategic vacuum left in Central Europe by the Soviets’ withdrawal.  A 
primary goal was to minimize the costs of these exchanges while maximizing the benefits 
for all involved.10  Latvia became the first participant in this new program, and its entry 
also shaped how the SPP would be organized and managed when it expressed to NATO 
its interest in the U.S. National Guard’s “citizen soldiers” organization.  The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and the National Guard Bureau decided that pairing applicant countries with 
willing U.S. states and using the National Guard as educators and diplomats were the best 
way to achieve a key SPP objective, namely, restructuring former communist militaries to 
accept subordination to civilian control and depoliticization.  By utilizing the talents of 
these state organizations, the NGB was able to showcase the unique nature of the Guard’s 
dual role: supporting civil authorities in peacetime and becoming warrior capable in times 
of war. 
From NATO’s and NGB’s websites, a thorough understanding of how the concept 
of a “Partnership” among nations came into being can be deduced.  Of special 
significance is the “Framework Document for the Partnership for Peace,” penned at the 
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, on January 10-11, 1994.11  
                                                 
8 From, “Remarks As Prepared for Delivery by William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense to the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government,” Harvard University, May 13, 1996. 
9 John R Groves, Jr., “PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering Engagement and Progress,” Parameters. 
(Sep 1998), 44. 
10 Ibid, 44. 
11 This document can be found online at: www.nato.int/docu/comm./49-95/c940110b.htm 
9 
This defined what would be required of member countries in the North Atlantic Alliance 
(NAA), specifying peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.  The 
National Guard had previously sought to further justify and expand the U.S. European 
Command's (USEUCOM) Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) and instituted the SPP as 
the key security cooperation tool for accomplishing the goals that became central to the 
NAA contract, allowing interaction in social and economic, as well as military spheres.12  
In what has been portrayed in program literature as somewhat of a “chicken and egg” 
argument about which came first – PfP or SPP, the dates of these documents show that 
prior to the Brussels meeting, The National Guard was already taking positive steps 
toward what the PfP Framework Document called for: 
The SPP was established following the National Guard Bureau's (NGB) 
proposal in the spring of 1993 to pair National Guard States with the 
Baltic Countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The NGB proposal was 
prompted by CINCEUR's Jan 93 decision to staff the Military Liaison 
Teams (MLTs) in the Baltic with Reserve Component personnel, to avoid 
sending a provocative signal to the Russian Federation that might have 
been caused by assigning active duty soldiers. The SPP thus began as a 
bilateral military-to-military contact program with which to engage the 
countries of central and Eastern Europe.13    
As more countries began to embrace the spirit and intent of the PfP, NGB 
involvement expanded at a rate not anticipated by the program’s initiators.  It soon 
became apparent that the original mandate of these two programs would have to evolve to 
meet the growing demand and that the arbitrary restraints initially placed on the NGB 
doctrine would have to be revisited. 
 
 
B.     THE EARLY DAYS 
Many authors have reflected on how quickly and successfully the SPP and the PfP 
took hold in Eastern Europe.  Their works showcased pairings of compatible states and 
                                                 
12 Information cited here is available online at: www.ngb.dtic.mil/staff/ia/spp_info_paper.shtml 
13 Available at: www.ngb.dtic.mil/staff/ia/spp_info_paper.shtml 
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countries blossoming into relationships that reaped a bountiful harvest of benefits and 
served U.S. security interests abroad.  The National Guard put forth the “citizen soldier” 
as the ideal ambassador, presenting hometown U.S.A. role models exemplifying the 
ideals of democracy, professionalism and deference to civilian authority.14  After the first 
two years of its existence and as word spread concerning the success and popularity of 
these programs, NATO made engagement a permanent cornerstone of its security 
architecture. 
Vernon Penner, in particular, portrayed the early days as a period of rapid 
acceptance and expansion of the PfP marked by overwhelming successes.  His 
recommendations for change were presented in the hope that the program would continue 
to evolve based on the quality relationships that were defining it.   He referred only 
obliquely to limitations that future changes would have to address, and he cited no 
mistakes stemming from inadequate diplomacy or shortcomings caused by program 
limitations as the reason for the evolutionary changes he proposed.  He gave four 
recommendations, set forth at a conference in 1996, for restructuring future PfP 
relationships, based on suggestions from existing partners.  These propositions were: 
strengthen the political component; redraft implementation documents; deepen 
integration and refocus training objectives; and require more from partners.  His 
recommendations called for expansion, not correction or revision, based on partners’ 
desires to increase and reinforce overall participation. 15 
 
 
C.     CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
On closer inspection of early reviews of these programs, one may be erroneously 
impressed that everything related to PfP/SPP had been done flawlessly.  The available 
literature from that period tended to be tautological, as writers cited each other, offered 
                                                 
14 National Guard Bureau/ZI. “Doctrine for National Guard Cooperative Efforts with Other Nations.” (Arlington, 
VA: April 1998), 9. [Photocopied]  
15 Vernon Penner, “Partnership for Peace,” Strategic Forum. Number 97, (Dec 1996). Online at: 
www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum97.html 
11 
little criticism of the programs, and instead regurgitated praise.  Serious evaluation 
emerged only in 1999, in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, when Jeffery Simon 
assessed the negative effects the PfP engagement program had for Balkan and Eastern 
European participants, and especially those effected by the war.  Specifically, he focused 
on how differently the first three PfP members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic) were treated by NATO compared to later partners of the Membership Action 
Plan (MAP), a program developed out of the Washington Summit in 1999 to make the 
PfP more operational.  Simon’s accounting of program obstacles provided an alternative 
perspective on the program that contravened the rosy portrayals of its past, especially 
with respect to the often heard misconception that PfP relationships guarantee or signal 
imminent NATO membership.16    In order to evaluate these early days and assess the 
programs in general, one must seek outside resources. 
Stepping past the early evaluations, Harkavy and Neuman provided a useful 
discussion on security assistance that may be applied in evaluating the PfP/SPP programs 
going beyond what the authors intended for their chapter, “Security Assistance and 
Warfare.” 17  Local, state and national program managers will be well advised to study 
this definition as they shape individual programs, in order to guard against what Harkavy 
and Neuman refer to as “acts by foreign actors that directly or indirectly influence the 
capacity of one or more combatants to fight a war.”  One of the most worrisome effects 
inherent in engagement programs such as these is the potential for a country that had 
been receiving military-to-military cooperation through partnership to backslide away 
from democratic reform and use its new knowledge in malicious ways.  A less 
pronounced, but potentially more insidious characteristic would be the unintended 
consequences of misinterpretation by neighboring countries of these partnership efforts 
related to the level of impartiality exerted in promoting democratic reforms.  As will be 
shown later, China represents the best and most unsettling example of this complication. 
Alexander George offered another analytical perspective worth considering that 
relates to the concerns expressed by Harkavy and Neuman.  His chapter, “Appeasement 
                                                 
16 Jeffery Simon, “Partnership for Peace (PFP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo,” Strategic Forum. 
Number 167, (August 1999). Online at: www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum167.html 
17 Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Warfare in the Third World (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 256.  
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as a Strategy for Conflict Avoidance” in Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in 
Foreign Policy, outlined the differences between appeasement, entente, rapprochement 
and détente.  It also raised issued pertinent primarily to adversarial relationships, but 
equally as well to burgeoning SPP contacts.18  He argued that a fine line exists between 
appeasement and constructive engagement and that one would do well to consider the 
recipient of support before lending either. 
Related in a fashion are the different types of engagement that the U.S. promotes - 
alliances, partnerships, executive decisions, and “partner-like” activities.  Alliances are 
binding legal associations that carry the burden of reciprocity between signatories for 
defense related promises.  Partnerships, in the context of the PfP and SPP, fall short of 
this legal structure, offering assistance, support, education and aid, but not the binding 
“you watch my back while I watch yours…” promise entailed in alliances.  “Partner-like 
activities” take an additional step away from the formal commitments of alliances in that 
no long-term commitment is implied in the exchange of services.  Executive agreements 
may resemble any of these at the whim and will of the commander-in-chief.  Such 
international accords are enforceable under international law, but do not require 
submission to the Senate for advice and consent (although in contemporary times most 
are submitted pursuant to legislative action.  Copies of all executive agreements must 
now to be transmitted to Congress within sixty days of enactment, according to the Case-
Zablocki Act of 1972).19  
NGB maintains presentations on its website that describe program shortfalls and 
issues of relevance for managers seeking to safeguard their partnership activities.  These 
include funding issues, operations tempo (OPTEMPO) concerns, and on a broader scale, 
problems related to overall program construction.  Of these, the current limitation for 
each state to concurrently engage only one partner represents a dilemma that 
NGB/International Affairs (NGB/IA) will have to deal with if the program continues to 
draw interest from emerging democracies in the globalizing world.  At last count, there 
are only 17 states and 2 territories currently eligible to accept new partnerships.  The 
                                                 
18 Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 67. 
19 Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and its Members (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2002), 410-11. 
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program’s doctrine outlined a three-stage lifecycle, consisting of initiation, sustainment 
and maturation phases, to ensure that milestones are met and graduation from the 
program by the military occurred.  This process freed the state from its commitment so it 
could take on a new partner country.  An unfortunate consequence that program 
architects failed to consider was the popularity of interaction that partners enjoyed. This 
generated hesitancy for dissolving the military-centric relationships. 
Standardization of events and metrics are also highlighted as areas that need 
improvement and modification.  As the program matures, state administrators will 
increasingly want to engage in dialog with other participants about successful program 
approaches to pursue and pitfalls to avoid.  NGB will require ways to evaluate 
partnerships for their validity and cost-effectiveness.  There are concerns that these 
programs are not adequately defined to achieve the objectives they purport to embrace.  
Metrics, if they exist at all, lack the ability to assess accomplishments.  Some have gone 
so far as to accuse the U.S. of destabilizing regions through conflicting intervention 
programs.  Addressing engagement in the Trans-Caspian, Stephen J. Blank wrote that, 
“There are good intentions, a collection of activities, but no well-defined grand strategy 
or deeply conceived analysis of the area’s strategic potential for or against U.S. 
operations in the area.”20  Blank continued by arguing that EUCOM does not specifically 
spell out whether it is accomplishing the goals of the national strategy it supports.  
Without valid measurements for success or failures, a gauge for effectiveness does not 
exist.  
Finally, standards of conduct by these “weekend diplomats” are becoming a 
significant factor in current relationships.  Presently, very few participants have any 
formal foreign relations or civil-military relations training before setting off for their 
partner countries.  The next phase in the program’s national development should require 
formal training for state managers, such as participation in the Civil-Military degree 
program offered at the Naval Postgraduate School or other related military branch 
specific education programs.  These programs will help guarantee expertise in the 
administration of individual partnerships. 
                                                 
20 Stephen J. Blank, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Europe,” SSI Report, June 2000, 
32-3.  At: www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2000/milengag/milengag.htm 
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D.     PRESENT SITUATION: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
Currently, SPP partnership shaping looks like this: 
Figure 1.   2002 Partnership Pairings21 
 
 
As stated earlier, Major General. Raymond F. Rees commented on the growth and 
popularity of the SPP to an audience at the 2001 SPP Conference.  General Rees’ 
revelation on the expansion of the program, especially in the Asian-Pacific region, 
reflects the insight and flexibility expressed in the governing NGB doctrine, which states 
that, “[the Doctrine for National Guard Cooperative Efforts with Other Nations] is a 
living document.  As more nations request formal association with the National Guard 
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and as these programs evolve, the doctrine will change to meet the needs of the United 
States and our associate nations.”22   General Rees’ qualification reveals the dynamic and 
unique nature of the bilateral relationships and the objectives that have grown with the 
program.  It further embodies the flexibility associated with expanding the program 
beyond the regions within NATO influence. 
Most cited literature addresses the goals and objectives of the PfP/SPP, but the 
best source of explanation related to these issues can be found within NGB Doctrine.  
Among the most important elements of the doctrine, four principal objectives:  promoting 
American values; supporting national security and military objectives; preventing and 
defeating threats and; supporting domestic issues, reflect a continuing value for these 
engagement programs that have matured over the years, but have not yet reached the 
stage where planners should contemplate “sunset status” for them.23   
Louis Goodman’s “Military Roles, Past and Present” gave a very comprehensive 
discussion on criteria for evaluating military missions, providing advice that may be 
applied to PfP/SPP activities over the past decade and that should continue to be applied 
in future engagements, stating: 
Smooth cooperation among allies is essential for the pursuit of common 
goals.  Moreover, the strongest international alliances involve cooperation 
in many diverse areas – diplomatic, commercial, cultural and military.  If 
such cooperation entails huge transaction costs, economic alliances may 
be noncompetitive, and security, environmental, or social alliances may 
become unwieldy…If the armed forces of nations trying to forge alliances 
take on markedly different roles and missions, their ability to cooperate 
militarily is likely to be impeded, with the possible spillover into other 
arenas.24  
His insight into the requirements for developing strong and stable alliances may 
be located in the objectives and goals of both the Partnership for Peace and the State 
partnership Program.  The advice quoted here for safeguarding future interaction 
                                                 
22 National Guard Bureau/ZI. “Doctrine for National Guard Cooperative Efforts with Other Nations.” (Arlington, 
VA: April 1998), 1. [Photocopied]. 
23 For those unfamiliar with this term, a sunset mission is one that has grown close to outliving its useful purpose 
and will soon be abandoned for more worthwhile projects.   
24 Louis W. Goodman, “Military Roles, Past and Present,” in Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, Eds. Larry 
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, ( Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1996), 32. 
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financially and operationally provides forewarning not just for alliances that the United 
States engages in, but also for the PfP/SPP structure as well.  Goodman’s counsel 
parallels and supports the recommendations of Penner in that these programs must 
increase the participatory roles of their economic and political elements to keep pace with 
military exchanges now underway.  Absent that, the programs will wither and die due to 
fiscal neglect, apathy, or a divergence of partner expectations.  Simon also gave 
numerous recommendations for enhancement and expansion of the PfP, warning that 
NATO credibility is on the line because a crossroad has recently been reached with the 
nine MAP countries awaiting invitations to join the alliance.  He concluded that managers 
must further clarify PfP issues, lest these MAP countries misinterpret participation and 
begin to expect rewards beyond what the programs have the capacity to deliver.25  This 
too is universally applicable to the expansion of engagement activities beyond the 
European continent.  The next chapter begins the discussion of the Asia-Pacific 
expansion and how U.S. led engagement must evolve to meet the specific concerns 
present there. 
                                                 
25 Simon, Jeffery. “Partnership for Peace (PFP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo,” Strategic Forum. 
Number 167, (August 1999). Online at: www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum167.html 
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III.     BUILDING NEW PARTNERSHIPS: THE ASIAN MODEL 
In recent years, the challenge for U.S. policy in Asia has been convincing 
Asian nations that we would remain engaged as we drew down our armed 
forces and brought troops home from other parts of the world.26 
 
The underlying principles that made European engagement programs like the PfP 
and SPP viable are compatible in application to new endeavors within the Asia-Pacific 
Region (APR).  After a brief synopsis of how the war on terrorism has affected the U.S. 
presence in Central Asia and the Far East, this chapter’s focus shifts to citing appropriate 
regional concerns and elaborates on the benefits partnership offers.  These include 
fundamentals identified by Lt. Col. Dubie: building democratic institutions; projecting 
American values; fostering free market economies, and; promoting military-to-military 
and civilian-to-military relationships.27  The discussion continues by defining how these 
issues serve the needs of Pacific partner countries.  The original SPP model requires 
some adaptation for regionally specific civil-military relations, economic aspects, and 
security concerns that are not germane to the European model.  Suggestions for change 
are presented here.  Finally, analysis of the growing U.S. presence as a Pacific nation 
introduces evidence that may support accusations of American hegemony. 
 
 
A.     ON THE WESTERN FRONT 
The war on terrorism has changed the perspective of U.S. engagement activities. 
This is certainly the case in U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) area of 
responsibility (AOR) where four SPP partnerships have matured since the mid 1990s.  
                                                 
26 Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security 
Arrangements,” The Washington Quarterly. Number 24, Volume 1 (Winter2001). Obtained online from: 
muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v024/24.1blair.html 
27 Dubie, 81. 
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These relationships developed with support and influence generated by bilateral 
interactions and became critical to U.S. strategic planning when the Bush administration 
set its sights on Afghanistan.  Building on foundations of good partner relationships, war 
planners were able to move Western aircraft and equipment into Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan.  Pakistan, while not an SPP participant, also allowed access to its bases.  
It is foreseeable that when the fighting ends in Afghanistan, a continuing U.S. presence 
will remain in the region as a vigilant warning that terrorists are unwelcome there.  If the 
new Afghan government leads its country down a democratic path, it certainly would 
become a viable candidate for SPP consideration. 
Admiral Blair, the flag officer who headed U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
from February 20, 1999 to May 2, 2002, stated recently that as USCENTCOM pursues al 
Qaida within its AOR, many of these terrorists would seek shelter in the Asia-Pacific.  
Speaking with Margaret Warner for the show NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, in response to 
her question on where the real problem areas are, he stated, “it's sort of an arc that 
stretches from the southern Philippines, northern Malaysia around through across [sic] 
some parts of Indonesia, which is a huge country, 17,000 islands, and as wide as the 
United States, up into say Burma…it's this seam of lawlessness where not only can 
terrorists find a place to work from but also pirates and drug runners and gun runners and 
people who are a threat to the region and to the United States.”28  Admiral Blair is often 
quoted naming these threats as the largest challenges to security and peaceful 
development in Asia.  These dangers have direct bearing, not only on American armed 
forces stationed in the region, but also on the residents of the APR.  Dealing with these 
issues is what the mission of Western peacetime engagement has come to be defined by.  
Tailoring the SPP to help partner countries confront these threats will be the challenge of 




                                                 
28 Admiral Dennis Blair, Transcript of Interview, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, 19 Dec 2001. Online at: 
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-dec01/blair_12-19.html 
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B.     ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIONAL EMPHASIS 
The United States maintains friendly relations with numerous countries 
throughout the APR.  Many of these have been formalized into alliances, as is the case 
with America’s five treaty partners; Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the 
Philippines.  This chapter does not dwell on these relationships as they have been 
thoroughly explored in other forums concerning their effects to regional stability.  They 
are mentioned only in that they represent a foundation for America as a Pacific nation. In 
a later chapter these alliances are mentioned as further evidence used in Chinese criticism 
to support the ideas of containment and hegemony that Beijing has long accused 
Washington of waging against China and the region.  Other relationships that only 
receive short mention here include U.S. ties to Taiwan and Singapore - associations that 
merit entire studies individually - so that the crux of the argument can be investigated.   
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century attempted in 1999 to 
predict how the world might be shaped in the first 25 years after the turn of the century.  
In Phase One Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment the commission 
defined East Asia as “containing not only upwards of a third of the world’s population, 
but also what is widely taken to be the most likely future politico-military near-peer 
competitor for the United States (China), two of its most critical allies (Japan and Korea), 
and one of its most intractable problems (North Korea).”  The report also predicted that 
Northeast Asia might be the most likely region to witness a major war.29  Further, 
Admiral Blair, addressing the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary Forum in January 2002, defined 
the region and the specific concerns demanding immediate attention by stating: 
Over the past several months, countering international terrorism has been 
our first priority in the U.S. But the events of 11 September also 
accelerated security cooperation among Asia-Pacific nations and their 
armed forces on many fronts…What missions such as combating 
terrorism, illegal immigration, countering narcotics, and stopping hostage-
takers have in common is that their solution is beyond the resources and 
authority of any single country and its armed forces. These enemies draw 
on worldwide networks of support, and use international borders to their 
                                                 
29 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, “The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global 
Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century,’ in New World Coming: American Security in the 21st 
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advantage. These foes can only be defeated by international cooperation. 
The Asia-Pacific region does not have well-developed arrangements for 
regional military cooperation. Yet, regional cooperation is the key to 
success against these threats to the security of all of our citizens. 30 
These definitions of the APR and its concerns are important to SPP architects as 
they tailor the program for regional application.  However, the most important reason for 
a U.S. military presence in the Pacific may arguably be the region’s reliance on a naval 
power capable of maintaining and protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).  
Each year, over half of the world’s shipping passes through these waterways.  John H. 
Noer writes that, “The three ‘southern entrances’ into the region: the Straits of Malacca, 
Sunda, and Lombok are particularly important chokepoints in the world trade system.”  
He also included the sea-lanes adjacent to the Spratly Islands in this collection of 
internationally strategic interests.31  Since the Cold War, the U.S. navy has maintained a 
presence in the region to insure freedom of navigation, protect against piracy and 
promote stability, primarily because it was the only force capable of these tasks.  Future 
peer competition between China and the U.S. for naval supremacy in and around the 
SLOCs is predictable because China also relies on these chokepoints for the majority of 
its shipping, especially oil from the Middle East.  Conservative estimates show that if 
China continues its economic modernization, its demand for oil will increase 
exponentially.  Having the U.S. monitoring the route of delivery for this critical import 
understandably would worry a PRC government that has traditionally regarded 
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C.     MODIFY THE OLD OR BUILD A NEW BLUEPRINT 
The cooperation Admiral Blair speaks of will include engagement activities such 
as the newly introduced Asian-Pacific SPP.  Currently only two relationships have been 
formalized into true partnerships and Mongolia, having been approved for the program, 
awaits a state to claim the opportunities of this third association.  According to Major Jon 
McIntosh, the Pacific Desk Chief for SPP at NGB, “a multitude of engagement 
opportunities have developed for the National Guard in the new security cooperation 
environment.”32  Converting the SPP from its NATO past into a viable program for the 
APR is the current task for program managers. 
These administrators, both in Washington D.C. and at USPACOM in Hawaii, 
agree that the basic structure of the SPP as outlined in the Doctrine for National Guard 
Cooperation with Other Nations and NGB State Partnership Program Standard 
Operating Procedures provide adequate guidance for implementation in the APR, 
however, since neither has been thoroughly reviewed since 1998, they require a new 
evaluation.  Any bias still remaining toward the “former Soviet state, Soviet controlled 
country model” must be removed.  Colonel Newton, NGB program manager to 
USPACOM, commented that, “both documents should now reflect the new thrust of the 
SPP toward all countries and not just former un-friendlies.”33 
Another concern for program managers customizing the SPP should be to 
empathize with the independence of some Asian nations and their concept of an Asian 
culture.  There are APR countries that are in no hurry to give up their current forms of 
government, embracing instead, a form of culturalism that prejudices or outright rejects 
Western ideals.  Originating in Singapore in the 1970s and 80s, government ministers 
fretting over the loss of cultural identity, concluded that liberal democratic values and 
Asian culture were fundamentally incompatible.  Surain Subramaniam traced this history 
and evaluated the various schools of thought influencing the dialog over what has 
become the Asian Values debate.  He identified three main schools of thought - 
                                                 
32 From NGB-IA memorandum titled, “After Action Report-Pacific Command (PACOM) Interagency and 
Country Team Theater Security Cooperation Working Group (IAACT/TSCWG),” Honolulu, HI, 22-25 Jan 2002. 
33 Colonel Ken Newton, interview by author, 17 Oct 2002, conducted via e-mail. 
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Formative, Reactive and Pragmatic - concluding that all three streams, although 
disagreeing fundamentally, believe that Asians should reject liberal democratic values.34  
The SPP must embrace the fact that these forces are currently present in Asia and 
construct the APR model, sympathetic to these concerns.  Applying Subramaniam’s 
discussion of the Universalist School of Thought, which defends the compatibility of 
Asian values and democratic liberalization stating that, “the liberal democratic path has 
universal applicability,” individually sculpted programs can be developed in each new 
partnership.35 
There are a number of other issues that program administrators must contend 
with.  A major premise of the SPP implies that the National Guard will not intrude upon 
any nation that does not first invite such activity.  This places the SPP into a passive 
position with respect to the 43 potential partner candidates in the APR, a reasonable 
circumstance regardless of how program managers feel about whom in the region might 
benefit from partnership interaction.  Colonel Newton adds that the State Department 
restricts engagement potential on Myanmar (Burma), Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, China 
and Indonesia for various reasons.  The shear size of the APR makes engagement 
challenging and more costly than its European counterpart.36  Also, with the U.S. focus 
having been traditionally Euro-centric, regional education of the APR has lagged behind 
experiences gained on the European continent.  APR interaction for has been limited and 
currently on two states - Alaska and Hawaii - and Guam maintain National Guard 
contingents.  Once the program begins to mature, it will have to draw on non-Pacific 
volunteers, such as it did by matching Washington and Thailand, to meet the anticipated 
demand for partners. 
All SPP activities must be coordinated through the respective theater component 
and are operationally controlled (OPCON) by that component commander while in 
conducting activities in the region.  Therefore, it is imperative that the working 
relationship between NGB program managers, individual state planners and the staff of 
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PACOM J5 (Strategic Planning and Policy) remain strong and transcend personal 
affiliations and routine transfers of participants.  Having strong support from the J5 for 
SPP opportunities will help generate and guide future activities.  Because one source of 
funding available to the SPP comes from the component’s exercise program, a mature 
understanding by the overseers of these purse strings can ensure active inclusion for SPP 
participation.  Colonel Newton currently fulfills this liaison role between NGB and 
USPACOM; it is vital for the program’s continued visibility and acceptance that NGB 
maintain the J5 relationship he has cultivated. 
SPP provides the USPACOM another Theater Security Cooperation Tool (TSC).  
TSC objectives are designed to maintain coalition war fighting skills for deterrence and 
build regional coalition capabilities to carry out missions, from peacekeeping through 
combating terrorism.  “NG engagement activities that meet TSC priorities can be 
conducted with any and all PACOM AOR countries.”37  These mil-to-mil events, referred 
to by NGB as “SPP-Like” activities, can be executed without formal SPP agreement and 
presumably could include engagement activities with non-democratic countries, given the 
correct assemblage of conditions and with respect to State Department restrictions.  
Presently, program managers feel the likelihood of any engagement with countries such 
as China or North Korea would tightly controlled, extremely limited and would not be a 
part of any planned expansion of the SPP. 
As the SPP evolves within the region, the list of appropriate engagement activities 
must keep pace.  The National Guard’s vast array of knowledge and expertise represents 
the essence of the citizen soldier as warrior and statesman, technician and 
businesswoman.  Tapping into this wealth of experiences and adapting them to current 
and future situations will contribute to the long-term viability of the program.  This has 
become more clear in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, where terrorism has 
threatened peace and forced the world to look at itself through a different perspective; 
one that will nevermore neglect security as it strives for stability and prosperity.  The 
Guard is uniquely equipped to support this evolution as another “tool in its bag” of 
available services. 
                                                 
37 From PACOM Information paper, “National Guard State Partnership Program in PACOM.” [Photocopied]. 
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As regional security has entered the lexicon of post 9/11, peacetime engagement 
priorities must focus not just on how to secure American military force protection during 
SPP events, but also provide a valuable product the program could offer its partners.  
Again, Admiral Blair chose prophetic words that express this idea eloquently: 
Much of this process of developing shared expectations of peaceful 
change is the business of policy and diplomacy, but it has a significant 
military component.  The armed forces of the region tend to harbor 
unwarranted fears of neighbors and regional powers.  Regional security 
would be improved if the armed forces of the region tailored military 
capabilities and plans and conducted unilateral exercises in ways that 
increased transparency and warning times, raised thresholds for military 
action, and supported peaceful solutions over time.38  
His words fittingly describe a goal that SPP relationships must strive to achieve in 
this new dangerous world.  As National Guard experts share their knowledge of security 
and counter-terror tactics, they will make their partners active participants in the process 
of securing the region and providing international legitimacy to the American presence in 
the APR.  This in turn will diminish the perception of the United States as “lone 
superpower, unilaterally forcing its will upon the region.”  This idea parallels the course 
expanding engagement programs took in Europe in the 1990s and anticipates rapid 
acceptance in the APR, but for a different reason.  The SPP grew rapidly in Europe due to 
the promise of Western principles filling the void left by the fall of Soviet communism.  
The SPP in the Asia-Pacific region is expected to expand due to the loss of security from 
the growing threat of international terrorism.  Smaller states that currently suffer from a 
lack of internal safeguards will increasingly look to the U.S. for help in securing their 
borders against the infiltration of these shadowy organizations.  The SPP will serve itself 
well in the region by emphasizing its expertise in countering terrorism and border 
security. 
The SPP has only begun to establish its foothold in the APR with the first 
partnership pairing of Hawaii and the Philippines in February 2000.  Initial exchange 
activities began shortly thereafter, including subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs), 
tabletop exercises and leadership seminars.  On March 11, 2002, Admiral Blair, the U.S. 
                                                 
38 Blair and Hanley. 
25 
Pacific Commander, approved the second SPP pairing between Washington State and 
Thailand.  Here also, exchange activities have begun.  It is the hope and goal of the 
program that through these relationships and others to follow, concerns over territorial 
rights can be peacefully addressed, regional stability maintained and democratic ideals 
advanced.  When asked what he felt the greatest prize the U.S. could hope to achieve 
through an SPP relationship, Colonel Newton gave an admirable citizen-soldier response.  
He said, “It would be for one of the SPP countries in the Asia-Pacific AOR to legislate or 
direct the formation of a viable reserve component in their military.  Many nations in the 
AOR have some loose semblance of a reserve force, but are impotent without a legal 
basis and a programmatic method of training and equipping [these forces].”39  As will be 
shown in the next chapter, Mongolia represents the best candidate for realizing this jewel 
in the SPP crown. 
 
 
D.     BENEFACTORS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
Highly important to the expansion of the SPP, the APR has recently opened up 
and nations with nascent democratic rumblings are taking notice of the benefits afforded 
through partnership.  Foremost among these are Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Malaysia 
and India.  Each has either asked for consideration, been approached with information by 
NGB program managers and/or begun “SPP-Like” activities, including SMEEs, high 
level military and civilian exchanges and conferences.40 
Indonesia also presents a likely candidate, however, its leaders have much to 
accomplish in stabilizing the government before it will be considered a viable SPP 
participant.  In an article on Indonesian democratic transition, Ronald Montaperto, James 
Przystup, Gerald Faber and Adam Schwarz gave numerous recommendations for gaining 
stability in this SE Asian center of gravity.  Many of the suggestions echo SPP objectives, 
including: establishing civilian control of the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia’s 
national military), high level officer exchanges and democratic reform leading to military 
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subordination and trust.41  Exploring this potential relationship would have far reaching 
benefits, not just due to the SLOC issue raised earlier, but also because a healthy 
Indonesia is essential for stability in Southeast Asia and to the vital interests of U.S. allies 
and friends. 
The primary obstacle now standing in the way of Indonesia’s full participation is 
the Leahy amendment, which prohibits the U.S. military from assisting foreign militaries 
that violate human rights with impunity.  It restricted resumption of mil-to-mil contact 
and IMET participation for Indonesia, stemming from 1997 events in East Timor.  
Indonesia longs for a lifting of the Leahy amendment to allow some military assistance 
such that it can re-equip and rebuild it military for the tasks of keeping the archipelago 
together, combating terrorism and helping the U.S. safeguard the SLOCs under its 




E.     CONCLUSION: THE NEXT STEPS 
One look at the geography in this area reveals why pursuit of engagement type 
relations as an element for maintaining security should be an obvious and foregone 
conclusion.  Indonesia borders all three straits.  Japan, Australia and the nations of 
Southeast Asia send over 40 percent of their trade through these waterways and 
approximately 70 percent of Japan's and South Korea's oil resources flow through the 
Palawan Strait next to the Spratly archipelago.42   Territorial claim disputes over the 
Spratlys by The Philippines, China, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei continue to 
be a source of tension in the region.  China increased the stakes in the mid 1990s by 
building permanent structures on Mischief Reef, territory The Philippines claims, but in 
early November 2002 signed a non-binding agreement designed to prevent open conflict 
over disputes in the area.  This action may signal a potential warming of relations 
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between Beijing and its Southeast Asian neighbors as China ushers in its fourth 
generation leadership.   
The spread of Islamic terrorism constitutes another important reason for 
establishing and maintaining good U.S.-APR relationships.  Malaysia and Indonesia have 
large Muslim populations and pockets of poverty that have proven fruitful ground for 
terrorism’s recruiters.  Admiral Blair, speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee 
stated: 
We cannot provide adequate protection to our citizens and our forces 
while only playing defense.  Since 11 September, combating terrorism on 
U.S. territory throughout the Asia-Pacific region has been USPACOM’s 
top priority.  We are succeeding, largely as a result of cooperation among 
many nations. Countering terrorism has accelerated security cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific region, but has not fundamentally altered the region’s 
security challenges.  A secure, peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific 
region remains very much in the interests of America and the world. 43  
These statements, as well as Admiral Blair’s defense of bilateral cooperation 
arrangements as having paid large dividends with regard to the war on terrorism, support 
the argument for expanding the role of engagement throughout the APR. 
Future participants will determine how well Asian-Pacific engagement programs 
are developed and executed.  Whether they present a threat or an opportunity to non-
democratic regimes lies in how partners choose to manage their individual programs, 
which countries ask for and are accepted into the programs and if accessibility of SPP-
Like activities can be offered to those non-democratic governments.  With regard to 
China, Admiral Blair reflected his opinion on how America should approach this 
relationship by stating, “It is in the interests of the United States to interact with the PLA 
to address common interests, such as combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, 
search and rescue, counterdrug, counterpiracy, and humanitarian assistance.  These 
interactions should be reciprocal and transparent and serve to reduce misunderstandings 
and the risk of miscalculations on both sides.”44  In Chapter V, China will be discussed in 
detail for its reactions to the presence of America within its sphere of influence, how 
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44 Ibid. 
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engagement programs like the SPP are perceived by Beijing and what, if anything the 
U.S. and the National Guard can, or should, do to respond to Chinese criticisms. 
29 
IV.     MONGOLIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE NEXT PACIFIC 
PARTNER 
To protect the rights of its citizens and to deliver the other basic services 
that citizens demand, a democratic government needs to be able to 
exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force in the territory.45 
 
Appearances can be deceiving.  Such is the case when studying the modernization 
of Mongolia and trying to pinpoint the start of its path toward liberal democracy.  Much 
current research begins with the pullout of Russian forces in 1990 and Mongolia’s new 
constitution in 1992.  But ask a Mongolian and he’ll likely say that his country’s quest for 
modernization has been like attempting a trek across the Gobi Desert; it’s been long and 
sometimes painful and scary, not knowing what lay just beyond that dune (or border).  It 
also required no small amount of help from friends and acquaintances.46  In fact, this 
analogy closely follows the new direction that scholars of Mongolian history are now 
taking.  Nakami Tatsuo, writing in Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked 
Cosmopolitan stated that, “since the beginning of Mongolia’s era of ‘democratization’ in 
the early 1990s, Mongolian scholars have begun to reevaluate [their early twentieth 
century history] and have initiated new studies on the 1911 declaration of independence 
and the formation of the Bogda Khagan regime.”47 
The goal in this chapter is to set out the important events that mark this long 
journey, introduce the actors who have both helped and hindered Mongolia’s progress 
along the way and continue to influence the shape of modernity in the country, and to 
                                                 
45 Juan J. Linz, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
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identify challenges not yet met.  Armed with this information, a review of Mongolia’s 
2001 “Defense White Paper” will pinpoint issues Mongolian planners hope to achieve 
through their engagement efforts with the United States and how an SPP relationship may 
help fulfill some of these concerns.  For the purposes of this thesis, Mongolia was chosen 
because it was selected for partnership in March 2001 and awaits a Guard Bureau 
decision on a partner state.  Its selection and extensive consideration in this chapter 
reflects its importance to the underlying supposition that U.S. engagement in Asia will 
have a profound effect on Chinese attitudes and potentially Beijing’s actions in response.  
Mongolia represents the archetypal partner candidate in that it needs what the United 




A.     THE ROPE IN THE SINO-RUSSIAN TUG-OF-WAR 
Robert Rupen described Mongolia’s fate prior to the revolution of 1911 as being 
decided by three masters: Russian, Manchu-Chinese, and Japanese.  The Outer Mongols 
frequently and quickly had to adjust in response to the outcomes of relations between 
them.48  Mongolia’s history before the beginning of the twentieth century reflected close 
ties economically with China, however deep seeded animosity on the part of both peoples 
left Mongolia wishing for a better alternative.  In 1911, it received its first opportunity.  
Following the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, secret negotiations between Russia and 
Japan placed Outer Mongolia into the Russian sphere of influence and as the Manchu 
dynasty collapsed, Mongolia declared its independence.49  The loss of the Outer 
Mongolia was protested, but to no avail by the Chinese, who were forced by Russian 
agreements in 1913 and 1915 to accept Mongolian autonomy.    After a short period of 
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relative independence, aided by Russian support, Mongolia was again occupied by 
Chinese warlords from 1919 until 1921 when, as Rupen puts it, “China’s inability to 
control White Russian anti-Bolshevik activity in Outer Mongolia served as justification 
for the Red Army to move in, and that move resulted in the establishment of a 
Communist-oriented government in Mongolia.”50  This Russian act temporarily ended the 
tug-of-war over control of Mongolia until 1924, when the U.S.S.R. and China signed an 
agreement giving control over Mongolia to the Beijing government and the Soviets 
promising to respect its sovereignty.  Marko Milivojevic wrote that information 
concerning the revolution of 1911 was all but erased by the communists in an attempt to 
validate their claims to what Milivojevic labeled as a “false revolution.”  This bit of 
historical revision attempted to mark the beginning of Mongolia’s Communist history in 
1921.51 
Although Soviet communist influences dominated Mongolia throughout the rest 
of the twentieth century up to 1990, the years were marked by fear of invasion and 
occupation by China and ambiguity over Mongolian autonomy by the Soviets.  The 
aftermath of the Second World War transformed Mongolia into a role as pawn in the 
“double Cold Wars” between the United States and the Soviet Union on one hand and, 
more distressing, between the USSR and China on the other, in which the Mongolian 
People’s Republic watched helplessly as Soviet missiles deployed in its territory. 
 
 
B.     A SOVIET SATELLITE 
Owen Lattimore described the differences between a colony and a satellite by 
defining the latter as a country under the influence or control of a protectorate that 
requires and often forcefully coerces restructuring of the satellite country in the 
protectorate’s image, while the former is not obligated to these assimilating duties.52  
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Mongolia’s fit within his definition of a satellite, however, may be slightly inaccurate.  
Most authors agree that whichever period of control - Russian or Chinese - Mongolian 
territory was little more than an extension of the protector’s border, but Mongolia’s 
autonomy was preserved and it was not forced into assimilating the protectorate’s 
characteristics.  An even more important aspect of these relationships - especially the 
Soviet - was how little aid the USSR offered to its satellite.  As reflected in Mongolia’s 
poverty and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lattimore’s definition might not 
be applicable in this case. 
Lattimore also coined the “doctrine of the irreversible minimum” to describe how 
protector countries like the Soviet Union could establish and maintain control of border 
countries while not actually annexing them.  In regards to creating a Mongolian satellite, 
Lattimore refers to the Soviet desire to protect its Siberian frontier from invasion by the 
Chinese.  In offering the Mongolian government an opportunity for autonomy coupled 
with economic support and a promise of protection against the Chinese and Japanese, the 
Soviets gained an irreversible advantage that required minimum expenditure of resources, 
secure in the knowledge that the Mongolians would not reverse the agreement because 
they recognized that their country was better off under Soviet protection.53  The 
Mongolians profited from this arrangement, not just in the receipt of protection but also, 
albeit insufficient to overcome its poverty, through an increase in trade opportunities with 
its patron. 
Over the years, Mongolia became so dependent on the U.S.S.R. economically that 
when it collapsed and pulled its troops from the territory, Mongolia was faced with 
economic, political and military deficiencies.  No longer was the patron there to insure 
against invasion by Mongolia’s stronger neighbor.  The economic trauma was two-fold.  
Mongolia had been importing nearly all of its oil, machinery and consumer goods from 
the north, so it had to now look elsewhere for these items.  Complicating this search was 
the introduction of fifteen new regional competitors for these goods, the newly 
independent states of the former Soviet Union.54 
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Much has been written concerning breakdown in communist governance, and 
conditions in Mongolia after the fall of the Soviet empire tend to support these criticisms.  
As an example, it is now widely believed that the communist system of collective 
farming and agricultural associations, adopted in 1955-1960, was incapable of raising 
livestock numbers significantly over the past 30 years.55  History about the present, 
written many years from now, will undoubtedly point to the collapse of communism as a 
key event, second to the 1911 revolution, in allowing Mongolia to cast off the burden of 
dependence on its stronger neighbors and modernize.  Further, it will reflect the strength 
of the Mongol people in fighting pressures undermining their cultural identity and point 
to the importance Mongolia played for the Soviets and the Chinese.  It will reveal with 
more clarity the security interests of these two powerful countries that were served by the 
small buffer country between them.  Guudian Tumurchuluun, chancellor at the Policy 
Planning Department in Mongolia’s Ministry of External Relations, wrote in 1995 that in 
the end, “neither Russia nor China succeeded in annexing Mongolia because our country 
served equally well as a buffer for both neighbors.”56 
 
 
C.     THE 1990 REVOLUTION: THE FAILURE OF COMMUNISM 
By December 1989, the rumblings of revolution could be felt in the cities of 
Mongolia.  Following a split in relations between the two powers in the late 1950s, the 
Soviet Union attempted to warm relations with China by withdrawing forces and planes 
from Mongolia’s border and Beijing began to breathe easier, knowing that Soviet troops 
were retreating from close proximity to the Chinese capital.  By the time the U.S.S.R. 
pulled back, it was in decline.  As the Berlin wall and the Soviet government fell, the 
Mongolian People’s Republic marked the beginning of the next and possibly most 
significant stage in its modernization.  In this chapter of their history, the Mongolians 
would emerge from the shadow of the protectorate and write the words themselves. 
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One theory behind the turnover in power from the ruling communist party to the 
new democratic forces in Mongolia argues that the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary 
Party (MPRP) fell out of favor due to the abandonment of Moscow following its collapse 
in 1991.57  Milivojevic cited the creation of the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), 
founded in Ulaanbaatar by 27-year-old Sanjaasuregiyn Dzoring, an event reported 
favorably by both the Mongolian and Soviet media,58 as a stark departure from the 
“cronyism” normally associated with communist regimes.  His rise, at such a young age, 
and that of many in Mongolia’s new democracy, speaks to the confidence Mongolians 
have in mortgaging their future to these promising young leaders and implies that the 
government is willing to take risks to develop the country’s independence and security. 
 
 
D.     GOING IT ALONE 
Not new among Mongolia’s border concerns is the fear that Beijing still considers 
Mongolia part of its territory.  Displacement, colonization and cultural absorption were 
still at the forefront of Mongolian concerns in the 1990s. One need only look at China’s 
geography to make a fairly accurate guess as to which direction it would focus attention 
if it were to become expansionist.  The path of least resistance and the road to greatest 
opportunity is toward Mongolia.  With a small population and many, as yet untapped 
natural resources, the opportunity may one day be too good for China to pass up.  
Mongolia’s fears are therefore not without merit.  Even a small invasion of immigrants 
from neighboring China could quickly make a minority of the Mongolian people in their 
own country.  Ravden Bold, writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review, stated that, 
“changes in the Sino-Soviet relationship and in the two countries’ thinking on strategic 
issues mean that Mongolia faces a far more complex security situation than in the 
comparatively recent past.”59 
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These fears can certainly be justified for a country not wanting to give up the 
gains that Mongolia now hopes to secure.  Indeed, since its move toward a free market 
economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia’s modernization could easily be described as 
accelerating.  Although poverty currently remains an overwhelming concern, even here 
Mongolia is making visible and significant progress.  The deep depression and economic 
crisis caused by the Soviet Union’s collapse began to turn around by 1995, and the 
economy has grown steadily since.  Unemployment and inflation are dropping, while 
industrial output is on the rise.60  Tom Ginsburg identified the severe social sacrifices that 
have been made in the wake of the basic reforms, but these have not led to retaliation by 
any of the country’s political parties.  He stated that “political and economic 
liberalization have proceeded faster and more coherently [in Mongolia] than in other 
countries in the region.”61 
 
 
E.     A LITTLE HELP FROM FRIENDS, OLD AND NEW 
Ginsburg also wrote, “The overarching goals of the Mongolian leadership are 
two: continued independence and the modernization of society.”62  Because Mongolia is 
surrounded on all sides by China and Russia, it believes the best alternative for 
maintaining a status quo regional environment conducive to its continued modernization 
is to play balance of power relations, using a technique it may have learned watching 
China manage relations during the bipolar Cold War years.  By increasing its ties 
internationally, Mongolia hopes to set up a balance between Russia and China by 
diversifying relations with other powers, such as the United States or Japan, or a coalition 
of countries.  It is currently too weak politically and militarily to take on the role itself.  
In the event of a threat coming from either Russia or China, Ulaanbaatar would seek 
support from among the others.  The theory holds that balance will be maintained so long 
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as its coalition remains united and stronger than the threatening country.  Mongolia is 
currently cultivating these international relationships with a diverse group of potential 
partners; the United States, Japan, Korea, and the European Union, to name a few.  In 
addition, in 1994, Mongolia and China signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.”  
This document reciprocally acknowledged territorial integrity and each country’s mutual 
respect for the other, and it was quickly followed by a similar agreement with Moscow.63 
The United States recognized Mongolia in 1987 and established its first embassy 
in Ulaanbaatar in 1988.  By granting most favored nation trading status to Mongolia, the 
United States has pursued an economic and cultural relationship and has supported 
market reforms and Ulaanbaatar’s emerging democracy.  Specifically regarding the SPP, 
Mongolia was approved as a partner country by USPACOM in March 2001 and NGB/IA 
is currently courting states to find one willing to establish a long-term bilateral 
relationship.  One of Mongolia’s primary goals through partnership is to achieve the 
benefit of Western principles regarding civilian control of its military.  From Mongolia’s 
Ministry of 2001 Defense White Paper: 
Strengthening and developing the civilian control over not only the Armed 
Forces exclusively, but as well as over the entire defense sector, remains 
the most critical and important issue of the defense policy.  Civilian 
control is an action by the public to exercise their authority, through 
government institutions, over the implementation of defense-related laws, 
over the professional military leaderships of the Armed Forces and other 
troops and, finally, over the defense budgeting and spending.64  
The SPP provides a platform for accomplishing many of the new government’s 
stated goals.  Ulaanbaatar believes the U.S. to be a benevolent superpower with no 
hegemonic designs on either Mongolia or the APR and will act as a counter to any 
attempt at regional domination by China or a resurgent Russia.  The United States has 
stepped up backing, providing financial aid of more than $100 million dollars over the 
past seven years, and is quick to respond to disasters.  In return, Mongolia was one of the 
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first to call on the president and offer support and assistance in the aftermath of the 
September 11 tragedy.65  
In pursuit of a balance of power, Ulaanbaatar has further cultivated a relationship 
with Japan that was established in 1972.  In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, high-
level visits have occurred frequently between the two countries, highlighted recently by a 
visit in 1997 by the Mongolian prime minister to celebrate twenty-five years of 
diplomatic relations and in 1998 by the president to confirm a comprehensive partnership 
agreement between the two countries.66  A lasting relationship begun in 1992 with the 
European Union also provides Mongolia with international ties and aid.67  From these 
relationships and others not named, Mongolia seeks to nurture support for its 
modernization while not becoming overly reliant on any of its new friends and upsetting 
the strategic triangle it seeks to build.  This multilateral approach to securing regional 
security, continuing democratization and advancing free market economic gains will 
work only if Mongolian leaders recognize that the state of relations with Russia and 
China will continue to remain the major factors affecting Mongolia’s fate.68 
 
 
F.      CURRENT STATISTICS 
In order to place Mongolia’s modernization in perspective, it is useful to describe 
its composition.  This section contains information drawn from various texts and atlases, 
many now available online.  Mongolia now supports a population of approximately 2.4 
million people.  This makes Mongolia a small country by population standards, but one 
that encompasses a large land mass, about one fifth the size of the United States.  Six 
million Mongolians live outside of the country.  Mongolia shares a border of 
approximately 2500 miles with China and an 1850-mile border with the Russian Far East.  
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It is landlocked, and therefore transportation agreements must be negotiated with its 
neighbors.  Almost 90 percent of Mongolia is pasture, desert (the Gobi), or mountains.  
Most of the people living in Mongolia live in one of the three major cities: Ulaanbaatar, 
the capital (650,000); Darhan (90,000); and Erdenet (65,000).  The primary industries are 
livestock and mining.  In an effort to expand its industrial base and generate interest in 
the country and revenue for its continued modernization, the Mongolian government 




Figure 2.   The Country of Mongolia70 
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G.     PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
The Prime Minister of Mongolia Nambaryn Enkhbayar recently stated on 
Mongolia’s “Open Government” Website, “In the past 10 years of transition from central 
planning to a market economy and from an autocratic regime to a democratic one we 
have experienced significant problems, but also accomplished a great deal. However, 
much remains to be done, especially in the area to improve business climate in the 
country and facilitate an effective dialogue between policy makers and the people.”71 
In converting the economy from one of a centrally planned nature to a market 
economy the, “70 years of communist misrule by the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary 
Party (MPRP), which has left Mongolia economically backward and stagnant,”72 will 
have to be overcome.  With China, Russia and the independent states of the former Soviet 
Union emerging as regional competitors, Mongolia will have serious challenges ahead.  
Its market size, limited resources, and lack of scientific knowledge and professional skills 
will make its modernization more difficult than its better-equipped neighbors.  
Furthermore, the situation in the former Soviet Republics is similar to the economic and 
political restructuring faced by Mongolia. As stated earlier, competition between these 
fifteen countries and Mongolia represents potential flashpoints for regional conflict.  
Most importantly, Mongolia may not, as yet be capable politically or militarily to handle 
a crisis alone, if one arose.73 
Change in Mongolia is necessary if it is to continue on its modernization journey.  
The Mongolian government has become a test case of the revolutionary measures it is 
now undertaking.  Included among these is a complete transformation of the economy to 
a free market system and to a government that reflects this fresh start with new ideas.  
Voters have determined that their representatives, most born after 1960, will preside over 
a more open and democratic government.74  
 
                                                 
71 The Prime Minister’s comments and other information can be found at: opengovernment.mn/english/index.html 
72 Milivojevic, 1. 
73 Background Notes, 11. 
74 Milivojevic, 22-23. 
40 
H.     CONCLUSION:  CREATING A NEW PARTNERSHIP 
It has been said that Mongolia possesses one of the most strategic locations on 
Earth.  In addressing this claim, the government has set as one of its primary foreign 
policy objectives the goal of keeping a good balance between its two neighbors.  By 
setting up a strategic balance between Russia and China with either a strong partner like 
the United States or a coalition made up of some combination of the 140 countries that 
have opened diplomatic relations with it, Mongolia hopes to play balance of power 
deterrence in the region.75  In this endeavor, U.S. engagement programs like the SPP are 
well suited.  Using the citizen-soldier concept, modernizing and subordinating the 
military to civilian control can occur without unduly disturbing Chinese and Russian 
attitudes.  Fears of a predominating U.S. effort will likewise be dispelled because the 
small footprint of SPP interaction.  However, a potential misinterpretation of partnership 
actions could occur, depending upon how Russia or China perceived the relationship.  In 
this regard, Mongolia’s foreign policy concept states that:  
Mongolia will not interfere in the disputes between its two neighboring 
countries unless the disputes affect Mongolia’s national interests.  It shall 
pursue a policy of refraining from joining any military alliance or 
grouping, allowing the use of its territory or airspace against any other 
country, and the stationing of foreign troops or weapons, including nuclear 
or any other type of mass destruction weapons in its territory.76 
Mongolia increasingly is participating as an active member of the international 
community, making its presence felt in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum.  Ulaanbaatar has weighed in on nuclear proliferation 
by declaring itself a nuclear-Weapon-free-zone in 1998.  Further, by virtue of its unique 
history as a Soviet satellite and an emerging democracy, Ulaanbaatar considers itself a 
stabilizing force on the Korean Peninsula, as it shares good diplomatic relations with both 
the North and the South. 
Where it may seem that small states are being marginalized by the globalization 
of the world economy, Mongolia refuses to give in.  Here again, an SPP relationship, as it 
matures, will foster economic ties that strengthen the Mongolian free market and reduce 
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its poverty in ways that could prove beneficial to the NEA region overall.  Mongolia 
appears to be doing all the right things, both economically and diplomatically, for all the 
right reasons.  The people are making their voices heard.  The prediction here is 
optimistic for the continued success of its modernization and liberalization as the people 
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V.     CHINA'S ENCIRCLEMENT: ISSUES ON SECURITY AND 
STABILITY 
This chapter could easily have been titled “the effects chapter” since the bulk of 
its content deals with Chinese reactions to various influences within its sphere of interest.  
The chapter explores the outcome of the 16th Party Congress and analyzes expectations of 
China’s continuing economic prosperity.  PRC perceptions of Western engagement and 
most importantly, how the war on terrorism is shaping Sino-U.S. relations throughout the 
APR are assessed.  American foreign policy with regard to China throughout the past 
decade has been one of ambiguity, not just in the U.S. position concerning Taiwan, but 
also in how past administrations have approached Sino-U.S. relations in general.  This 
chapter addresses how Washington’s approach to China took on an appearance of 
engagement while still holding Beijing at arm’s length.  These actions have prompted 
PRC accusations stating that U.S. policy seeks to contain China.  Andrew J. Nathan and 
Robert S. Ross argue, “In the United States, China policy is a chronic political problem in 
a government divided both between president and Congress and along party lines, and 
Americans are debating over whether to ‘engage’ or ‘contain’ China.”77  Recent activities 
in the Department of Defense, undertaken within the framework of combating terrorism, 




A.     AWAKENING THE SLEEPING DRAGON 
China is currently engaged in a period of transformation that promises to usher in 
major changes for the way the Communist Party governs.  The 16th Party Congress has 
ended and the members of China’s fourth generation of leadership have been announced.  
The question to be assessed now concerns what effects to the country’s stability will 
result from these changes?  Using the past two decades as a benchmark for predicting 
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how internal politics will evolve, this section addresses how Beijing will likely react to 
U.S. operations on its periphery and throughout the APR. 
This chapter’s judgments rest on the premise that China is continuing in a slow 
evolution of incremental political change, marked by sinicized democratic concepts and 
away from hard line socialism.  Chairman Mao probably would have considered 
blasphemous terms used in Western literature to describe the political revolution that has 
been underway in China since the Deng years by adopted capitalist reforms that were 
redefined by Deng Xiaoping Theory into “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”  
According to Joseph Kahn, who writes for the New York Times, “China’s leaders are 
blurring the class distinctions they once considered sacred, perhaps jettisoning ideology 
altogether, in a race for relevance.”78 
Politically, the CPC doesn’t favor complete democratic transformation because 
open elections carry inherent risks to the party’s retention of power.  However, adopting 
individual democratic principles and playing “socialist reform” semantics, may pass 
Deng’s proverbial “black cat, white cat” and “on time trains” tests.  Democratic-styled 
elections for village-level posts were quietly implemented and eventually expanded 
throughout the countryside in 1988.  This reform will not be embraced at the national 
level in the near future.  Taiwan’s example of how quickly democracy blossomed in the 
1990s through agitation by a growing middle class has left a fearfully indelible mark on 
the CPC.  As China cultivates its own nascent civil society and faces the great intangible 
question of how this group really views current socialist reforms, another revolution may 
be incubating.  Jiang’s Three Represents concept, having been enshrined along side Mao 
Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory in the constitution, seeks to bring this 
entrepreneurial voice into the Party’s fold. 
Authors like James Webb who tend to take a hard-line view towards China 
believe that the theory of liberalization through engagement and free trade will not work 
with the PRC government.  He believes that this optimistic view of transforming Chinese 
socialism into a new democracy is untested and may have the ultimate result of making 
American investors and business ventures the hostages of the PRC’s true revolution in 
                                                 
78 Joseph Kahn, “China's Communist Party, 'to Survive,' Opens Its Doors to Capitalists,” New York Times, 4 Nov 
2002, Sec. A, 10.  
45 
military affairs (RMA), an economic weapon.  He warns that U.S. business interests 
should “see the danger of having exposed themselves to the unpredictable nature of an 
un-elected, authoritarian government.”79 
Within Jiang’s reorganized Politburo, only two members have significant military 
backgrounds, suggesting that unless Jiang could somehow retain control over the Central 
Military Commission (CMC), civil-military relations would have to evolve as well.  
Evidently believing it to be either the most prudent course to follow or, more likely, an 
attempt for Jiang to retain ultimate political control, an announcement was also made at 
the 16th Party Congress stating that Jiang would remain CMC head for the foreseeable 
future.80  There is logic in this action, even if the appointment is only temporary.  Jiang 
maintains the trust of the military.  Retaining his authority will prove a calming force 
through the transfer of power to the fourth generation.  The war on terrorism adds further 
justification for Jiang to reduce the number of moving parts within the transition process.  
It may also prevent Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian from interpreting CPC 
reorganization as a weakening in China’s resolve and consequently as an opportunity to 
declare independence.  Jiang’s retention of his CMC post imparts a deterrent to 
Taiwanese action - Taipei knows his policies - and provides a voice of reason if the 
situation across the Straits sours.  Presumably, it would also diminish any thoughts of 
military coup by a PLA that perceives weakness in the next generation’s leadership 
qualities.  Jiang represents a base of stability, while Hu Jintao - presumed to eventually 
replace Jiang – could potentially bring democratic change to the military in the form of 
establishing true civilian supremacy over it.  If Hu’s administration is greeted with 
respect by the military, and alters the PLA focus from party-centric to state-centric, a key 
door may eventually open for the United States to establish more meaningful military-to-
military contact with Beijing. This opportunity would further expand if democratic 
reforms bloom. 
 
                                                 
79 James Webb, “The Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2001.  Accessed online at: 
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B.     REACTIONS 
Determining how domestic politics will change as the 16th Party Congress 
adjourns is merely one step in predicting Chinese reaction to U.S. activities throughout 
Asia.  Historical experience from past Western influence in the region and the levels of 
engagement now being considered by Washington both have relevance in how the PRC 
reacts to Western operations.  A quick reflection from China’s past brings back memories 
of British colonialism, Japanese imperialism, and perceived American hegemony, all 
marked by either attempts to carve up the “Middle Kingdom” or occupy it.  Prior to 
September 11, 2001, China bristled about U.S. containment and Western hegemony 
throughout Asia, but at the same time it relied on this presence for regional stability.  
Nathan and Ross wrote that, “Barring an intensification of the U.S.-China conflict, 
Chinese leaders perceive the American presence in Asia as contributing to regional 
stability and Chinese security.”81  Beijing, in response to continuing U.S. engagement and 
enlargement practices developed under the Clinton Administration, sought multilateral 
relations with ASEAN and Russia. 
According to Ronald Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk in 1997, PLA analysts 
argued that the alliances the United States has in northeast Asia are products of the Cold 
War, represent outmoded thinking, and should be replaced with new models for regional 
security based on Sino-Russian security architecture, developed by the PLA.  This new 
format stresses common security, cooperative security and comprehensive security.  The 
bilateral alliances the United States cultivated in Asia are in the words of PLA analysts, 
“rapidly outliving their usefulness.” 82  PRC interpretations of the U.S. Defense 
Department concept of “shape, respond, and prepare now” were, in the words of Evan A. 
Feigenbaum, misconstrued to mean an aggressive military effort was being undertaken to 
extend U.S. strategic interests and preserve American hegemony.83   
                                                 
81 Nathan, 79. 
82 Ronald N. Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk, “PLA Views on Asian Pacific Security in the 21st Century,” 
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47 
China continues to harbor a paranoid fear of a resurgent Japanese military and 
accuses Washington of allowing Japan to rearm within the context of expanding the 
treaty to cover regional security.  Feigenbaum pointed to a Chinese analytical contention 
that if alliances require targets, current formal treaties involving the United States and 
APR partners must be targeted at China with respect to its predicament over Taiwan.84  
Theater Missile Defense (TMD), if deployed in Japan or South Korea, would allow 
“Tokyo to shed its traditional role of shield to the U.S. sword and develop a sword of its 
own.”85  Analyzing PRC criticisms of TMD and using predictions for the region’s future 
by John J. Mearsheimer, it is easy to extrapolate why Beijing fears this new defense 
system.  He believes that if the U.S. were to withdraw from the APR, Japan would be the 
most likely candidate to fill the void left in regional security.86  Not possessing nuclear 
weapons and banishing their presence on Japanese soil in the peace constitution leaves 
Tokyo without a viable offensive deterrent to match China’s growing ballistic missile 
arsenal.  A proven TMD deployed in Japan would allow it a defensive deterrent that 
neutralizes China’s edge, while also keeping within the stipulations of the constitution. 
From its own regional security assessments, China clearly spells out its suspicions 
and justifications for claims of American encroachment:   
There are new negative developments in the security of the Asia-Pacific 
region. The United States is further strengthening its military presence and 
bilateral military alliances in this region, advocating the development of 
the TMD system and planning to deploy it in East Asia. Japan has passed 
a bill relating to measures in the event of a situation in the areas 
surrounding Japan. All this goes against the tide of the times. Joint 
military exercises have increased in the region, to the detriment of trust 
between countries. The uncertain factors affecting security on the Korean 
Peninsula continue to exist, and the situation in South Asia remains 
unstable. Encroachments on China's sovereignty and interests in the South 
China Sea are not infrequent, and some extra-regional countries are 
attempting to interfere in this issue.87 
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C.     ASSESSMENTS AND PREDICTIONS  
Given the ambiguous nature of U.S. relations with China, careful consideration of 
relationship building in this region is paramount to U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific.  
By applying color to a map of the APR (see Figure 3), shading the countries that are 
presently interacting in engagement activities with the United States (green) or are being 
courted (blue), Beijing’s concerns gain validity.  Add the presence of the U.S. Navy 
along the eastern China seaboard, through the straits of Southeast Asia and stretching 
across the entirety of the Pacific Ocean and it becomes readily apparent that China may 
have some justification in its accusations of American containment and encirclement. 
 
 
Figure 3.   An Encircled China?88 
                                                 
88 Map source from: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/asia_pol00.jpg, Modified and colored by 
author.   
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Increasingly, as the U.S. and its Western allies pursue the war on terrorism, more 
is being written that stresses these concerns.  For example, The Economist stated: 
Many Chinese strategists openly worry about what they regard as the 
encirclement of China by American power in the wake of the September 
11th terrorist attacks.  American troops have been deployed in Central 
Asia, an area where China has been trying to expand its influence. 
America has also strengthened its defence relationships with Japan, the 
Philippines and China’s close ally, Pakistan.  “It is possible that the 
stationing of American troops in Central Asia will be prolonged.  This 
could remould the strategic configuration of the area, presenting a 
challenge to China’s security and strategic interests,” says a Chinese 
researcher, Deng Ho, in International Studies, published by a government-
sponsored think-tank.89 
This situation is also referred to by Barthelemy Courmont, a U.S. foreign policy 
expert at the French Institute of International and Strategic Relations, who accused 
Washington of “establishing an outright network of allied or friendly states in the region, 
which could have the result not only of encircling China, but also, and above all, of 
depriving it of its hegemony in Asia.”90  These accusations represent a pattern of thought 
that must be addressed if U.S. security and stability interests will continue to be served in 
the Asia-Pacific region.   
In the conclusion of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer 
discussed prospects for Chinese hegemony and how the U.S. will be affected should 
Beijing achieve its stated goal of quadrupling the current GNP by 2020.91  Claiming that 
China as regional hegemon represents “the most dangerous scenario,”92 Mearsheimer 
stated that developing this exercise to its logical conclusion has a great power China 
using its wealth and dominance to control Japan and South Korea while hanging out the 
“Yankee Go Home” sign to American influence in the APR.93  Interpreting remarks made 
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during an April 2002 trip to Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Jiang Zemin appeared to 
support China’s growing desire to replace the U.S. as overseer of regional security stating 
that, “One of the primary issues for China is to protect developing countries from the 
pretensions of the United States.”94 
What appears a slight irony in China’s accusations of the United States is that 
Beijing continues a military buildup that it one day hopes will rival and push U.S. forces 
out of the region, assuming for itself the role of regional hegemonic protector.  China 
claims it desires multilateral stability for Asia, while it predominately engages only in 
bilateral associations in the region.  Two notable exceptions to this are Beijing’s 
development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its involvement with 
various branch agencies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  PRC 
rhetoric, which speaks of regional cooperation and breaking down territorial tensions, 
conspicuously leaves out Taiwan, Tibet and Chinese claims in the Spratlys and Parasols.  
Mearsheimer stated, “It is certainly in China’s best interest to be the hegemon in 
Northeast Asia, it is clearly not in America’s interest to have that happen.”95 
While continuing to voice its concern over NATO expansion in the west and 
Japanese rearmament in the east, China, between April 1996 and June 2000, created the 
Shanghai Five, an organization of central Asian nations - China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - with regional and border security as well as military 
confidence-building as the organization’s focus.  Now termed the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), it appears that Beijing may have adopted a page from the NATO 
and SPP playbooks, transforming the SCO into a forum for mutual exchange of security, 
political, economic and trade issues.  Citing China’s National Defense White Paper 
released in 2000, the SCO is committed to: 
Deepen cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic and trade, 
military, military technology and other fields to consolidate regional 
security and stability, and to effectively implement all the clauses of the 
agreements they have signed concerning confidence-building in the 
military field and the mutual reduction of military forces along the border 
areas. They have made it clear that they will never allow any country to                                                  
94 Kerry Dumbaugh, “China-U.S. Relations,” Issue Brief for Congress, July 17, 2002.  Online at: 
www.fas.org/man/crs/IB98018.pdf. 
95 Mearsheimer, 402. 
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use their territory to conduct any activities detrimental to the sovereignty, 
security and public order of any of the five countries, and that they will 
support each other's efforts in safeguarding their national independence, 
state sovereignty, territorial integrity and social stability.96   
The last part of this passage points to conflicts of interest among Central Asian 
states that currently participate in the SCO and also engage in Partnership activities with 
the U.S. supporting the war on international terrorism.  Should the U.S. pursue long term 
basing, as has been suggested,97 interpreting these charters may lead to increased tension 
should Beijing believe that U.S. intensions are other than its declared war on al Qaida.  
Echoes of these allegations have already surfaced as American forces continue to mass in 
Central Asia.  Consider:  
If the US is able to have its wish fulfilled of stationing troops in Central 
Asia, or controlling Central Asian nations, impelling them to join NATO, 
then China will truly be tested.     If it is said that the incident of the 
embassy bombing and the aircraft collision incident were both probings 
between China and the US before a future conflict, then the US, after 
completing the strategic east-west encirclement of China, and with regard 
to carrying out the already determined policy of splitting China, will go 
from the strategic stage of promotion to entering the strategic stage of 
implementation.98 
A more optimistic perspective on how Beijing’s regional security efforts and U.S. 
engagement programs like the PfP/SPP might interact in future engagements was 
suggested in a report on the SCO by Xu Tao, a deputy director and associate research 
fellow in the Eurasian Studies office of the China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations: 
Various countries have actively taken part in transnational security 
activities with different composition characteristics and work focus, such 
as the “partnership for peace plan,” the CIS collective security pact 
organization, and the central Asian alliance, in a bid to establish a 
multifulcra and multistructural international cooperation guarantee for 
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guarding against aggression and harassment by terrorist, extremist and 
separatist forces.99  
In his 1994 Air War College thesis, Michael Dubie, argued that peacetime 
engagement programs represent a force multiplier that will pay national security 
dividends into the 21st century.100  He may not have known at that time how prophetic 
these words would become in less than ten years after he had penned them.  Following 
the September 11 attacks and in advance of the initiation of U.S. - Afghanistan hostilities, 
men and equipment deployed into central Asian countries, and previous strategic 
competitors began to cooperate with the drive to root out international terrorists, 
generated by President Bush’s “you’re either with us or against us” speech. 
Another issue is whether the political approaches that the new CPC leadership 
inherited will continue to succeed.  Juan Linz does not think so.  In Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation, he argues against the “one country-two 
systems” concept China initiated for Hong Kong in 1982, stating that within the overall 
framework of a totalitarian or post-totalitarian state, citizens of the larger unit see one 
region enjoying freedoms to which they do not have access.101  If the CPC can continue 
China’s economic prosperity, larger sections of the country must begin to enjoy similar 
success to that of Hong Kong and Macao.  A downturn in its economy or the failure to 
provide a comprehensive plan for supporting workers displaced by inefficient state 
owned enterprises (SOE) would ultimately lead to unrest or violence.  Fear of spill-out 
from refugees fleeing an unstable China into SPP partner countries could quickly 
overwhelm their native populations.  Jiang believes that the “three represents” theory will 
account for and accommodate this situation while still “holding high the banner” of 
Chinese socialism.  How history will interpret future changes toward Chinese 
democratization is left to be determined. 
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D.     CONCLUSION:  IS THE THREAT REAL? 
There is no apparent danger in maintaining an ambiguous foreign policy with 
Beijing.  In the past, when isolated tensions have occurred, an atmosphere of status quo 
was preserved within the APR.  Engagement practices were credited with allowing both 
the United States and China to prosper.  So long as engagement program managers 
proceed with caution, this equilibrium, at least in the short term, is expected to remain.  
The greater question is how the war on terrorism will continue to broaden the scope of 
U.S. engagement along China’s borders and what the fourth generation PRC leadership 
will do in response.  Advantage within a framework of status quo has traditionally 
favored the defender of it. 
A primary objective for regional organizers of U.S. engagement programs like the 
PfP/SPP should be to diffuse suspicion by clearly defining intentions of their programs 
and allaying fears that a Western encirclement is afoot.  In explaining the program to the 
skeptical, it must be pointed out that the SPP is a small footprint operation designed not 
to escalate a U.S. presence but to encourage internal stability and interoperability.  Out of 
these partnerships, participating governments can confidently further their own 
relationships with neighboring countries from a position of predictable constancy.  
Governments like China that engage PfP/SPP countries will be able to do so comfortable 
in the knowledge that interaction is with predictable neighbors and not Western trained 
loose cannons.  As the SCO matures, this should become evident to Beijing, since four of 
the original members also maintain SPP relationships and Russia has recently been 
negotiating with NATO for limited engagement activities. 
With regard to U.S. engagement with China, the rules become much stricter.  
Public law and State Department policy forbid or restrict many of the military-to-military 
benefits that present SPP partners expect and receive from their state relationships.  
Transparency and reciprocity are key issues that must be modified by the PRC if it were 
to desire a greater level of inclusion in U.S. engagement efforts than are currently 
prescribed by law.  Chinese policymakers apparently are cognizant of these benefits as 
evident in China’s National Defense in 2000 White Paper: 
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In May 1999, China postponed its high-level military exchange programs 
with the United States in response to the serious incident of bombing of 
the Chinese Embassy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the US-led 
NATO. Following the gradual improvement of the relations between the 
two countries, normal military contacts between China and the US have 
resumed. The defense ministries of the two countries held defense 
consultations at the vice-ministerial level in January 2000. The US defense 
secretary visited China in July of the same year. China has always 
attached importance to the development of military relations with 
European countries, and has exchanged or maintained high-level visits and 
conducted military exchanges with them at various levels.102  
Much of how Beijing views engagement actions on its borders and the continuing 
war on terrorism will shape Sino-U.S. relations for years to come.  How the fourth 
generation leadership handles its inheritance of power and the associated list of national 
concerns will ultimately determine if China will continue its economic success and 
related to that prosperity, continued democratic reform. 
It appears, if one accepts the situation presented by Nathan and Ross that Beijing 
needs Washington in the APR more than Washington needs Beijing, the U.S. position as 
a Pacific nation is stronger at present, politically, economically and militarily than 
China’s capabilities to replace it as regional hegemon.  Given Western interpretation of 
Beijing’s current attitudes, it has been shown that this is not presently a desired course for 
the APR.  This may change in the near future and U.S. policies, ambiguous or not, keep 
pace with China’s new “Long March” toward rising from regional to world power. 
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VI.     CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main point of this research on the origins of Western engagement and the 
expansion into the APR was to demonstrate that actions taken by the United States in the 
name of engagement don’t threaten China and increase regional security, stability and 
mutual prosperity.  The key factors in gaining acceptance by the PRC of U.S. intentions 
include emphasizing the benefits to stability and economic activity through partnership, 
downplaying the military nature (specifically pointing to the fact that partnership 
underscores civilian control of the military), and pointing out that there is not a concerted 
effort to “gang up” or contain China through the SPP.  The partnerships being created in 
the APR are truly bilateral in nature between the partner country and its paired state.  
These programs, while not individually threatening, when viewed collectively could 
conceivably represent containment in Chinese interpretation.  How many such affiliations 
Beijing will tolerate along its borders before it reacts, and more importantly, how it 
reacts, remain unknowable at present.  Therefore preemptive actions on the part of 
engagement program managers to reassure Chinese leaders of the benign nature of these 
relationships is critically important to their long term survival. 
Change in China is underway.  How much, how soon and by whom was the 
subject of speculation and guesswork prior to the 16th Party Congress.   Answers have 
now been partially revealed in the personage of Hu Jintao and presumably under the 
watchful and still powerful Jiang Zemin.  Three predictions appear plausible.  If Beijing’s 
stated goal of continued economic prosperity is to be realized, it must implement social 
and political reforms to keep pace with the economy or the entrepreneurs and the middle 
class will unleash what the Party fears most, urban unrest.  Second, Jiang’s successful bid 
to remain as CMC Chairman at least temporarily to insure a smooth handoff of the PLA 
to his successor will guarantee he continues to wield extensive power over China’s near 
term political reforms.  Third, the incremental changes that have already occurred 
foreshadow the next few years as the fourth generation fully takes the reigns of power 
and, barring the unpredictable, reform the Middle Kingdom in a gradual democratization 
pattern that will be fully realized by the time the fifth generation is ready to rule. 
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As change occurs within China, so also will the engagement programs introduced 
in the APR.  The objectives of the SPP as discussed here can find value and importance 
in this region, Beijing could almost certainly benefit from them as well.  Many authors 
have suggested that engagement with China would be prudent and beneficial to regional 
stability.  Unquestionably, China’s interests are currently not served by antagonizing 
Western power in Asia.  It relies too heavily on American exports and the security the 
U.S. military brings to the region for its continued economic prosperity.  It suspects that 
the U.S.-Japan alliance is the only reason Tokyo has not rebuilt its military machine. The 
PLA knows that it currently cannot replace the United States as a benevolent regional 
hegemon, if that truly has been a desired goal.  The world has shifted from a dangerous 
place in the face of great powers squaring off with each other to a dangerous place in the 
shadowy depths of international terrorism.  The first steps in any competition are to 
choose up sides and the world’s players are now in the process of picking which team to 
join.  As China’s fourth generation leadership will soon be burdened with the difficult 
task of redefining its foreign policy with Washington, strategic partners in the war against 
terrorism has a much better ring than strategic peer competitors pitted against one 
another. 
Mongolia was introduced as the next SPP partner through its historic rise from the 
ashes of the Soviet implosion.  Currently, Mongolia enjoys healthy relationships with 
both stronger neighbors, but this calm may only be superficial.  Munkh-Ochir 
Dorjijugder, a Naval Postgraduate School student from the Mongolian Ministry of 
Defense, believes that Mongolia is now more vulnerable than during the period when it 
fell under the Soviet’s protective umbrella.103  He believes that a shift in focus has 
occurred with the cooperation agreements Moscow and Beijing have been crafting since 
1995, away from Mongolia as their lone regional buffer in favor of concentrating their 
efforts with or against Central Asian states that harbor Islamic terrorist interests.  In light 
of the events following September 11, 2001, his concerns are not without merit and lend 
support to claims Ravden Bold made back in 1991, as Mongolia continued to shift its 
attention and cooperation beyond its two immediate neighbors.104  In many ways, 
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Mongolia could still benefit from the support it lost when the U.S.S.R. collapsed.  Some 
domestic factions may still long for the return of a benevolent authoritarian to again 
present their nation with a security blanket.  Neither China nor Russia currently has this 
capacity, and neither has voiced a desire, to implement such power.  The SPP relationship 
that Ulaanbaatar seeks can help provide the ingredients that support Mongolia’s 
continuing democratic transformation and increase its confidence working as an actor on 
the international stage.  The Mongolian SPP represents a perfect platform for properly 
implementing the lifecycle model and it holds the best promise for achieving Colonel 
Newton’s greatest outcome, a civilian controlled military with a professional reserve 
component. 
Finally, the SPP has begun to establish its foothold in the APR.  As new nations 
are introduced and become partners, the program’s goals expect it to evolve and grow to 
meet the special challenges of the region.  Anticipation has it that the new Pacific model, 
once it becomes recognized within the APR, will catch on like it did in Europe in the 
1990s. This will occur, not because a retreating superpower (the USSR) created a void in 
regional stability, but because terrorism has created a demand for greater assistance in 
meeting the new perceived void in regional security.  Should engagement programs gain 
broad acceptance in the region, the critical shortcoming will be the “One State-One 
Partner” limitation.  Managers may soon find themselves readdressing this constraint. 
The war on international terrorism will continue to shape the strategic environment and 
U.S. national interests will remain threatened by those who seek to limit or destroy 
Western democratic principles.  Using the recommendations outlined in this research, 
program managers will inevitably find that this is not the end of the discussion, but 
merely a convenient pause.  Engagement practices that promote peaceful coexistence, 
economic prosperity and civilian control over the monopoly of violence are essential to 
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